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We develop and test predictions on how early-career challenges arising from the workplace context affect 
short- and long-term career advancement of individuals. Typically an organization’s decision to deploy a 
manager to one of several possible contexts is endogenous to unobservable factors, and selection makes it 
challenging to disentangle the effect of workplace context on individual career advancement. We work 
around this problem by studying an organization, the Indian Administrative Services, which deploys entry-
level managers quasi-randomly across India. We find that managers deployed to more challenging contexts 
early in their careers experience faster career advancement in the short term. We present suggestive 
evidence that this is because challenging contexts provide managers more opportunities to develop skills 
(‘crucible experiences’), and a greater motivation to relocate out of the challenging context. We also find 
that managers deployed to a challenging context early in their careers continue to experience faster 
advancement in the long term, suggesting that initial deployment to a challenging context is associated with 
human capital development. Managers initially deployed to more challenging contexts were not, however, 
more likely to break into the upper echelons of the organization  
 
 
 
 
Key words: context; location; workplace context, career advancement, performance; individuals; 
promotion; crucible experiences; motivation; internal mobility; human capital development; 
microfoundations.  
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 Career advancement measured in terms of promotions, and human-capital development during 
employment, are important topics for both individuals and organizations (Coff 1997, Wang and Barney 
2006). The path to career advancement affects future rewards for both individuals and organizations 
(Bidwell and Mollick 2015), and prior literature has shown that career experiences can shape and reveal  
human capital and affect career advancement of individuals (Campbell 2013, Dokko et al. 2009). The 
literature has also documented that early career experiences have a lasting effect on subsequent job 
performance via socialization, approaches to problem solving (Tilcsik 2014), and access to reputation-
building opportunities (Briscoe and Kellogg 2011).  
Past work has studied how contextual features like resource munificence affect individuals, but 
much of this work has focused on the impact of economic and technological factors on individual 
performance (Tilcisk 2014). A relatively unexplored area is studying the impact of workplace challenge—
uncertainty and threats arising from the broader sociopolitical context of the workplace. In this paper we 
explore how career advancement and human capital development vary among individuals assigned to 
locations characterized by differing degrees of challenge. 
  We hypothesize that individuals in more challenging contexts will experience faster short-term 
career advancement than those in less challenging contexts. We theorize that there are two mechanisms 
behind this: opportunities to develop skills and the motivation to relocate out of the challenging context. 
More challenging contexts present managers with opportunities to develop skills through on-the-job 
learning, or ‘crucible experiences’. More challenging contexts also impose greater constraints, motivating 
individuals to exert more effort in order to relocate out of the challenging context. Either or both of these 
mechanisms could lead to faster career advancement in the short term. We also posit that being deployed 
to challenging contexts is related to faster long-term career advancement and the eventual attainment of 
higher positions within the organization, through gains in human capital development. 
We test these predictions by examining the short- and long-term career outcomes of high-ability 
officers in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), whose job descriptions and explicit incentives are 
identical at the beginning of their careers, but who are deployed quasi-randomly to dissimilar regions of 
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India. These locations vary strikingly by the degree of challenge they present. Once deployed, these officers 
cannot change location without advancing vertically or leaving the IAS.  
Investigating how workplace context affects career advancement can be hindered by a methodological 
roadblock: the problem of selection. In conventional settings, organizations’ deployment decisions are 
endogenous to such observable and unobservable factors as firm strategy and individual differences (e.g., 
preferences and abilities).2 But the IAS’s quasi-random deployment of officers (validated by Iyer and Mani, 
2012), in conjunction with several robustness checks, allows us to reasonably control for endogeneity 
stemming from unobservable factors that affect performance. Our setting also allows us to hold constant 
explicit financial incentives; thus we are largely able to disentangle the effect of workplace context on 
career advancement.  
We find that individuals initially posted to challenging locations experience faster career advancement 
within the organization in the short term. Our setting does not allow us to isolate completely whether it is 
access to opportunities to develop skills, or higher levels of motivation to relocate out of the challenging 
context, that lead to faster advancement. We present suggestive evidence that both are contributory factors; 
individuals in more challenging contexts are presented more opportunities to engage and learn on the job. 
They also participate in a higher number of ongoing training courses, signaling greater motivation to build 
skills and exert effort, leading to faster advancement. We find that these individuals continue to advance 
faster over the long term, suggesting that they had accumulated human capital through their initial 
assignments. We do not, however, find any evidence that they are more likely to reach upper echelons in 
the organization than those who began in less challenging contexts.  
Hypotheses Development 
The terms career advancement, progression, and growth are understood to signify vertical mobility 
within an organization, characterized by change in an individual’s job description, responsibilities, and 
wages (Baker et al. 2002). Vertical mobility is brought about by promotion, which is positively correlated 
                                                          
2 Bray et al. (1974) conducted a rich study of the lives and careers of 167 AT&T managers beginning in the mid-
1960s but do not take these factors into account. 
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with job performance. In this study, we did not observe actual performance but instead observed career 
advancement.  
This paper argues that workplace context can influence career advancement of managers. When a 
set of individuals is deployed to various locations in an organization, the workplace context will alter the 
character of the actual task, rendering it more or less challenging. Following Dill (1958) and Duncan (1972), 
among others, we define the context of an organization as encompassing every aspect of its external 
environment that influences the decision-making, goal setting, and probability of goal attainment of its 
employees. This environment consists of physical, social, political, and regulatory factors that affect 
managerial tasks, external networks and relationships, labor supply, and technological inputs and outputs.  
We define challenging workplace contexts as characterized by (1) high levels of uncertainty and 
(2) threats arising from external adversity. Uncertainty arises from internal or external conditions that render 
operations, processes, and task outcomes unpredictable. In uncertain contexts, for example, inputs to 
manufacturing processes cannot be counted on to arrive at consistent times; this circumstance requires 
managers to be creative about scheduling, stocking inventory, and meeting deadlines. Threats can have 
similarly negative consequences (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) and can create barriers to attaining 
desirable outcomes. But uncertainty and threats are not limited to resource constraints and dynamic 
environments. They come in many shapes and forms, such as difficult external operational logistics, 
unsupportive colleagues or suppliers, or militant local factions. These would be universally perceived to be 
challenging, but challenge can also have an individual-specific component: for example, working in a new 
region entails more obstacles for individuals who do not speak the local language or understand its culture 
(Zaheer 1995). This paper focuses on the universally challenging components of a given context rather than 
individual-specific components. 
We theorize that the challenge within workplace contexts affects short-term career advancement of 
managers. This happens through two routes: (1) more challenging contexts provide greater opportunities 
for managers to develop skills on the job and (2) more challenging contexts will generate a higher 
motivation to relocate, incentivizing individuals to exert more effort.  
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 We first posit that challenging contexts present managers with opportunities to develop skills on 
the job. Past research has documented that around 70 percent of managerial learning is attributable to facing 
challenging3 demands and experiences on the job (McCall 2010; McCall, Lombardo and Morrison 1988).4 
When faced with challenge, managers must bridge the gap between their existing skills and perspectives, 
and those required by the situation. Managers respond to challenging tasks positively, by seizing 
opportunities to acquire new skills (Eichinger, Lombardo and Ulrich 2004; DeRue and Wellman 2009, 
Dragoni et al. 2009) such as that required in dealing with ‘nonauthority’ relationships, i.e. relationships in 
which the manager must develop strategies for influencing others and gaining cooperation from people over 
whom he or she has no formal authority (McCauley, Ruderman and Ohlott; 1994). To successfully confront 
challenge, managers must develop skills in networking, problem solving, or negotiations (Courtright, 
Colbert and Choi. 2014).  
There is, moreover, considerable anecdotal evidence that difficult managerial situations lead to 
intense unplanned experiences and call for extraordinary engagement by managers. In chronicling the 
experiences of managers contending with difficult situations, Bennis and Thomas (2002) assert that such 
situations offer managers opportunities to exert themselves in exceptional ways, often leading to 
transformative experiences that build superior leadership skills. These experiences can in turn lead to 
abandoning established methods of operation, as managers reexamine their own values and judgment and 
question their assumptions. Such experiences have been called “crucibles, after vessels medieval alchemists 
used in their attempts to turn base metals into gold” (Bennis and Thomas 2002). Challenging contexts can 
provide more opportunities for skill acquisition and thus be associated with positive career advancement 
outcomes.  
                                                          
3 The literature has a broad definition of challenge that overlaps with our definition.  
4 Evidence is emerging that some managers do not respond positively to challenge (Courtright, Colbert and Choi 2014). 
Specifically, managers’ perception of their own ability is found to moderate their responses to challenge. In our subsequent 
theorizing we make a latent assumption that managers of high observable ability will also have higher perceived ability. We will 
discuss the validity of this assumption in the Discussion section. 
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Our second argument is that challenging contexts characterized by uncertainty and threats to job 
execution may also inspire greater motivation and effort via a desire to relocate out of the challenging 
context. Evidence suggests that implicit career incentives play a strong role in employee performance 
(Baker et al., 2002). When advancement is the only way to relocate, context acts as an implicit incentive; 
individuals sent to challenging contexts will be highly motivated to win promotions and will thus exert 
greater effort. Managers who face obstacles to completing their tasks tend to be motivated to try to change 
their situation when they have the autonomy to do so (McCauley et al., 1994; Bandura, 1986, 1997). 
Moreover, individuals will be highly motivated to exert effort if they believe that doing so will lead to 
greater career rewards (Vroom, 1964; Katzell and Thompson, 1990). Finally, the Hull-Spence theory in 
psychology provides evidence that stress and anxiety arising from threats in an adverse environment 
increase individual motivation and effort (Taylor and Spence 1952; Farber and Spence 1953; Spence and 
Farber 1953). Building on this reasoning, we argue that individuals who find themselves in challenging 
contexts will be motivated to relocate and will exert greater effort.5  
To summarize, we predict that opportunities presented in challenging locations will lead to 
development of skills. Individuals in such contexts may also be motivated to exert greater effort in order to 
relocate. Both motivation and opportunities will affect their rate of career advancement, at least in the initial 
years. This argument leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Individuals deployed to more challenging workplace contexts will be promoted faster in the 
short term. 
 
We next theorize that the gains of being deployed early to a challenging context lead to human 
capital development, thereby affecting long term career advancement. There is evidence in the human-
capital literature that early workplace experiences shape and develop human capital in ways that persist 
long-term. Managers who build transferable skills will experience productivity gains in subsequent jobs 
                                                          
5 Hackman and Oldham (1980) suggest that specific work contexts can increase employees’ motivation to perform well. Kanfer 
and Ackerman (1989) show that individuals facing greater challenge in the workplace display higher motivation in executing 
their jobs. Locke and Latham (2004) have documented that uncertainty and obstacles at work can promote higher levels of focus, 
absorption, and engagement with the task. 
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throughout their careers (Becker 1964). Early-career individuals are more susceptible to environmental 
influence (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013) and to learning new skills, work routines, and practices, and these 
influences persist through their careers. Early professional training influences individuals’ norms and habits 
(Bercovitz and Feldman 2008) and their likelihood of adopting certain types of organizational practices; 
early social networks and socialization also influence subsequent career decisions (McEvily et al. 2012; 
Phillips, 2005). External contexts also shape the learning managers develop on the job: managers tend to 
acquire a different set of skills if they learn their trade during a period of resource scarcity than if they do 
so when resources are abundant (Schoar and Zuo, 2011; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) and the more similar 
the initial level of organizational munificence to subsequent periods, the higher managerial performance 
will be (Tilcsik, 2014). Lastly, early career information advantages lead to the development of skills that 
sustain these advantages over the long term (Burton, Sorensen, and Beckman; 2002). We draw on this well-
established literature to hypothesize that early-career deployment to challenging contexts will have positive 
persistent effects on speed of subsequent career advancement via human capital development. Our second 
hypothesis is therefore:  
Hypothesis 2. Individuals initially deployed to more challenging workplace contexts continue to experience 
faster career advancement in the long term within the same organization.  
 
Assuming that there is a positive relationship between being deployed to a more challenging 
workplace context early on, and career advancement over the long term, we may also expect such 
individuals to attain a higher ultimate position in the organizational hierarchy. Early external contexts 
influence the final status managers attain within an organization: individuals who began their careers during 
recessions were more likely to rise close to the top of their organizations (Schoar and Zuo, 2011). 
Organizations are likely to promote their internal candidates to senior positions rather than hire externally 
when they have a high manager to employee ratio (Baron, Davis-Blake and Bielby, 1986). They do the 
same for certain upper management positions, especially when job performance has a strong firm-specific 
component (Bidwell and Keller, 2014) or when promotions entail a great expansion of job responsibilities, 
such as in promotions from lower to upper management positions (Bidwell and Mollick, 2015). When 
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choosing whom to promote among their internal candidates, organizations are likely to choose those who 
have an established track record of faster career advancement in their prior careers within the organization. 
When organizations use promotions to sort people on the basis of ability, and are able to sort accurately, in 
a heterogeneous population of employees, those who are promoted faster once should continue to be 
promoted quickly again and again (Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom, 1994). We can therefore expect 
individuals initially deployed to challenging contexts to advance higher in the organizational career ladder. 
Thus our third hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 3: Individuals initially deployed to more challenging workplace contexts advance to higher 
levels on the organizational career ladder.  
 
The Indian Administrative Services: “Managers of Managers” 
To test our hypotheses, we examine the careers of officers in the Indian Administrative Services (IAS). IAS 
is the administrative service branch of the Civil Services of the Government of India. An IAS career is 
among the most prestigious in India. IAS officers enjoy considerable power and immense job security. 
Individuals enter the IAS after college graduation by taking a highly competitive and challenging three-part 
examination. According to 2013 results,6 776,565 candidates took the Civil Services examination and 1,078 
were finally accepted7, a final acceptance rate of approximately one successful candidate in 1,000.  
Selection into the IAS is followed by a training period, after which individuals are assigned to 
“cadres,” or the states in which they will spend much of their careers. As of 2015, India consists of 28 
states, subdivided into a total of 688 districts, where 22 languages are spoken8. Entry-level IAS officers are 
assigned to administrative positions at the district level. The administrative office in each district functions 
as an autonomous unit and all IAS officers at the same rank have the same job descriptions. After 
completing training, new IAS officers are responsible for managing their districts, supervising subordinate 
                                                          
6 Obtained from http://www.civilserviceindia.com/results.html (accessed 2 March 2015). 
7 This includes individuals who will join the IAS, Indian Police Services (IPS), Indian Foreign Services (IFS) and the Indian 
Revenue Services (IRS). The number of IAS officers joining each year is therefore a fraction of that the 1078 candidates who 
were selected into Civil Services. 
8 Typically, a cadre corresponds to a single Indian state; some small states are grouped into a single cadre. 
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officers, maintaining law and order, and implementing national-level development policies within their 
districts. Each officer operates autonomously, without a supervisor to monitor effort or help with task 
execution. The parameters of IAS officers’ task execution are loosely defined; they have considerable 
freedom to choose the methods they use to complete tasks. The role IAS officers perform is thus 
simultaneously managerial and entrepreneurial, like that of a corporate executive. Ferguson and Hasan 
(2013, p. 4) describe IAS officers as “managers of managers.”  
The performance of an IAS officer is determined by monitoring direct outcomes (not effort) and 
achievement of targets. Explicit incentives are identical for all officers at the same rank as they receive the 
same salaries and perks. There are two tracks to promotion. Conventional promotion is based on 
performance and length of service, and is limited to the individual’s state. On the second track, or fast track, 
IAS officers may start competing for “central postings” three years after beginning their service.  Central 
postings, which are prestigious and highly coveted, are positions at the central headquarters of the IAS in 
New Delhi, the nation’s capital. Officers who win such postings participate in national-level policy design. 
Central postings are not automatic; officers are assigned to the fast track when they meet or exceed certain 
performance benchmarks. The application consists of performance records and a CV. The posting is granted 
when the central office scrutinizes the application and approves the promotion.  
The IAS provides officers the option to augment their managerial skills through annual training 
courses9 held in management institutes throughout India. This training is entirely voluntary, and officers 
may request or decline it; officers are assigned the kind of training that is requested. New IAS officers are 
exposed to scholarly and practitioner-oriented knowledge about leadership tools and socioeconomic trends 
in India. The benefits of this training are twofold: managers learn new skills and their voluntary 
participation signals motivation and ability (Spence, 1973), as well as human-capital acquisition, to those 
who evaluate their suitability for a central posting. 
 
                                                          
9 This training lasts between one and four weeks each year. 
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A Natural Experiment: Randomized Deployment of Individuals to Locations 
The process of assignment to the cadres where IAS officers will spend most of their careers is quasi-random, 
which enables us to better disentangle the selection effect from the treatment effect. If there were any 
correlation between observed or unobserved correlates of individual ability and new officers’ initial 
assigned destinations, the effect of locational context on subsequent individual performance could be 
biased. Thus our identification strategy hinges on quasi-random assignment. 
New officers are asked to list their cadre preferences, but assignments are based on need, openings, 
and IAS examination rankings. Officers typically request their home cadres, but this request is granted only 
when four conditions are met: (1) the home state needs officers and has entry-level openings; (2) the officer 
most recently assigned to that state was from a different state; (3) quotas for members of disadvantaged 
social groups, amounting to 33 percent of all officers, have been met; and (4) the state’s ratio of high-
ranking and junior officers is appropriate. Individuals who are not assigned to their home cadres are 
assigned in alphabetical orders of their names to the next state with an opening, in alphabetical order. When 
the four conditions are met—which is typically quite rare—assignments follow IAS examination rankings 
and typically bind for the top 5–20 percent of a cohort. Thus, the top 5 percent of officers may be assigned 
to the cadres they requested, but others’ preferences are typically not met. Iyer and Mani (2012), who use 
a dataset similar to ours to study a different question, find that the correlation between ranking in the top 
20 percent and assignment to home cadres is 0.28, which is significant at the 5% level.  
 
Data and Variables 
We use two unique datasets for our statistical analysis. The first is a hand-collected personnel dataset of all 
1343 officers who joined the IAS between 1975 and 2012. The second is a hand-collected dataset on district- 
and year-level crime rates for the same years, obtained from the Indian National Crime Record Bureau. 
(The full population consists of 4474 IAS officers, but district assignments are available for only 2874; 
district-level crime data is missing for an additional 1531, bringing the final sample size to 1343 officers.)  
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To determine whether a sample consisting of less than the full population of IAS officers is biased, 
we looked for patterns in the missing data. We found that crime data were missing for certain years from 
almost all districts, but not disproportionately from any district. Nor did we find any significant difference 
in means of individual level observables, such as number of languages known, degrees, rank, prizes 
awarded and so on, between included and excluded officers We also examined correlations among variables 
for individuals whose district assignments were missing and found no significant pattern. We thus believe 
the data to be missing at random and our analysis is conditional on this assumption. 
 
Dependent Variables 
To determine whether individuals from more challenging contexts are promoted faster, we determine how 
many years (Years To Center) it takes to do so. For our long-term measure of promotion, we observe only 
individuals posted to the center. We construct a variable, (Average Years Taken to be Promoted after 
Center), which represents the average number of years it takes an individual to be promoted after transfer 
to a central posting in New Delhi.  We also create a dummy variable for each job title, and conduct a logistic 
estimation to estimate a difference in likelihood of attaining it based on initial assignment. We present the 
results of the estimation on the dummy variable Joint Secretary, set to 1 when the individual achieves the 
rank of joint secretary to the Government of India, an entry point into the upper echelons of the 
administration. An officer typically achieves this status on the fourth promotion after being promoted to the 
Center. (See Appendix for the hierarchy of positions within the center.)  
We hypothesize two routes by which context could influence career advancement: opportunity to 
learn skills and motivation to relocate out of the context. Because we cannot observe either directly, we use 
data on training courses to shed light on potential mechanisms. First, we code the content of training 
courses, as specified by their titles. A course whose title specifies “managerial decision-making” or 
“leadership training” (and similar designations) is classified as a leadership-training course; a dummy 
Leadership Training is set to 1 when an individual takes such a course. Second, we observe the association 
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between total number of courses (Number of Courses) taken prior to central posting and the crime rate of a 
district to see whether individuals from high crime districts take a higher number of courses.  
 
Independent Variables and Controls 
The main independent variable measures the degree of challenge that characterizes the locational context 
of an individual’s posting. Our proxy for challenge is the district’s crime rate (Crime).10 Indian districts 
differ widely in degree of law and order. Because crime rates are positively correlated with the prevailing 
degree of uncertainty and with threats to managerial goal attainment, crime is an appropriate way to quantify 
the challenge of a given location. Representative tasks of IAS officers include implementing poverty-
reduction projects involving subsidized food grains, implementing irrigation schemes to facilitate 
agriculture, and developing village health centers. In districts with high crime rates, IAS officers may have 
to improvise new methods to convey goods and resources to their intended recipients; they may have to 
negotiate heavily with external candidates to recruit subordinates of their choice. In environments with 
conspicuous mafia presence or high levels of Maoist violence, officers’ outreach to the community may 
require novel strategies. Thus we believe the crime rate of a district adequately and appropriately captures 
the challenge of the workplace context. To corroborate this assertion, we conducted field interviews. The 
Assistant Collector of a district in the state of Telengana explained, for instance, how the presence of Maoist 
groups near Adilabad creates a challenging environment for the IAS officer (District Collector) and his 
team. The Maoist presence impedes implementation of food-distribution programs, distribution of 
subsidies, and the like, and also promotes physical threats to safety stemming from adversity.  
High-crime areas have been found to be associated with higher underreporting of data (Soares 
2004); they tend to have lower-quality institutions and reporting mechanisms11. If that were the case, the 
higher-crime districts in our data are actually those with a higher institutional support, and our 
interpretations of the coefficient should be flipped. To address this question, we use two further proxies for 
                                                          
10 We use the log of the raw crime rate (annual crime rate per 100,000 district inhabitants) as the variable Crime. 
11 We thank three anonymous reviewers and our editor for bringing this important point to our notice. 
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challenge, which are well-known measures of uncertainty and threats, and are decoupled from institutional 
strength. The first is the dummy variable Red District, which is set to 1 if a district is part of India’s “red 
corridor”: a well-known region characterized by high poverty and extreme levels of Maoist violence.12 
Mineral-rich districts in India have historically been associated with high levels of crime (Fernandes, 2006; 
Mahadevan, 201213) and are not necessarily correlated with institutional strength14. We repeat the above 
estimation with a dummy for coal districts (Coal Present) as the independent variable15.  
Though we do not find evidence of selection into districts, we control for all observed correlates of 
ability that our data allows, such as rank on the IAS Entrance Examination (IAS Rank), number of degrees 
held (Number of Degrees), number of languages known (Number of Languages), and awards (Whether 
Awarded Prize). We also control for gender (Male) and age (Birth Year). Finally, to control for the 
possibility that certain individuals from high-crime-rate states may still wish to return to their home states, 
we control for whether or not the individual speaks a different language (Language Migrant). We construct 
a Herfindal index of the training courses taken by an officer to control for the specialization (Specialization).  
 There are plausible alternate hypotheses that might explain a correlation between crime rate of a 
district and the rate of career advancement of IAS officers deployed to the district. There may be direct 
organizational level factors that create structural differences in promotion rates among various districts. For 
example, organizations in high-crime districts may have better adapted to challenges and may have created 
routines and other institutional features that promote their employees faster to the center. This would mean 
that instead of context, individuals’ promotion rates are associated with institutional adaptations to the 
context. A second alternate hypothesis is that IAS officers are promoted to Delhi as a reward for the risk 
they take by accepting placements in high-crime-rate districts. To account for the possibility that structural 
time-varying differences in average turnover rates in high- and low-crime-rate district are related to 
institutional or organizational factors or adaptations made, we control for the average number of years it 
                                                          
12 Our list of Red Districts corresponds to that in http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/conflictmap.htm;  
13 Also, Asher and Novosad, NEUDC Conference Proceedings, 2013 
14 There are some districts that have good quality institutions and those that have poor quality. 
15 Our list of districts where coal is presents corresponds to that in Fernandes (2006). 
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takes individuals from a given district to be posted to the center prior to the year of joining (District Average 
Time to Center). District level fixed effects control for time-invariant differences. For all of our regressions, 
except where inappropriate, we also include year-of-joining (cohort) fixed effects to account for time-
invariant changes at the cohort level that may influence institutional factors. Finally, we use the total number 
of police officers present (Number of Armed Police) as an additional control for institutional strength 
(Soares, 2004).16 
 Another source of endogeneity is close connections between high-crime-rate districts and the 
administrative center. It is plausible that political-party officials in high-crime-rate districts are well 
connected to their counterparts in the center, and can use their influence to send their IAS officers to Delhi 
faster than those in low-crime-rate districts. This can only happen, however, when the ruling national party 
is allied with the state ruling party. Therefore, we code the political party in power at the center and the 
party governing each state. When there is a match between the two, we designate the dummy variable 
Whether State RP is Ally of Center to equal 1.  
 
Methods 
We have cross-sectional data on whether the individual was ever promoted to the center and if so, how 
many years were taken. To account for the right-censored nature of our data, we use parametric survival 
analysis to obtain estimates of crime rate, with a lognormal distribution.17 We measure the crime rate in an 
individual’s district by computing the average crime rate during the first four years of his/her posting. For 
ease of interpretation, we compute the log (base 2) of the crime rate as the independent variable so that we 
may interpret the coefficient as the average change in the rate of career advancement. Because this is a 
survival model, we interpret a negative coefficient on crime to mean that individuals exposed to higher 
levels of crime take less time to achieve central postings. We also normalize the crime rate to eliminate 
                                                          
16 Soares (2004) found that the number of police officers present in an area is positively associated with reporting of crime. 
17 We make this choice because Figures 1, 3, and 4 show that lognormal is a better fit than normal due to the skewness of the 
distribution.  
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undue influence of local trends and outlying observations and this helps alleviate concerns on time-varying 
confounding factors. 
 
Empirical Results and Qualitative Evidence 
To help mitigate concerns on the possibility that high-ability officers self-select into more 
challenging locational contexts, we examined the correlation between ranking in the top 20 percent and 
assignment to a high-crime district. This correlation is -0.0128 and insignificant. For the entire sample, the 
correlation between the crime rate of the district and observables is shown in Table 1.  
[Table 1 goes here] 
An OLS estimation finds a statistically insignificant association between all observable measures 
of ability (IAS entrance examination rank, number of degrees, number of languages known, whether or not 
the individual received an award) and the average crime rate of the district to which the individual is 
deployed. We also found a statistically insignificant association between gender and average crime rate but 
a statistically significant association with Birth Year; this is likely to be purely a mechanical association 
and we control for it in our estimations. Results appear in Table 2. Thus we can be reasonably confident 
that neither individuals with observable high ability nor highly motivated individuals are selecting 
themselves into high-crime-rate contexts, and our estimates measure the treatment effect of contextual 
challenge on individual career advancement.  
[Table 2 goes here] 
The summary statistics in Table 3 show that 84% of our sample is male, and 42% consists of 
language migrants (individuals who do not speak the language of the state to which they are assigned). Only 
37% of the sample of 1347 officers ever achieves a central posting. The wait to do so varies from 4 to 39 
years, with an average of 16 years and a very high standard deviation of 7 years, indicating wide variation 
in promotion rates. Our sample consists of 680 districts. The mean annual crime rate is 1.7 of penal code 
crime per 100,000 inhabitants; the standard deviation is 5.25. Annual crime rates range from .007 to 45.  
[Table 3 goes here]   
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Table 4 shows the difference in mean short-term rates of advancement between high- and low-crime-rate 
districts. The mean number of years it takes to achieve a central promotion is 15.013 in a high-crime-rate 
district and 17.067 years in a low-crime-rate district. The difference in means, 2 years, is significant at the 
1% level. Figure 1 (Kernel density estimates), Figure 2 (Kaplan-Meir estimates), and Figure 3 (in the 
Appendix) plot the distribution of short-term rates of promotion for high-and low-crime-rate districts. The 
distribution of years to achieve a central posting from high-crime-rate districts is shifted to the left of that 
of low-crime-rate districts, indicating that the average time taken is lower in high-crime districts.  
[Table 4 and Figures 1 and 2 go here] 
Next we present results from our statistical analyses. We conduct a survival analysis on the entire 
sample to estimate the number of years taken to reach the center (Years To Center). We include district and 
cohort fixed effects to account for time-invariant changes at the district and cohort level at the local level 
and other variables that may influence institutional factors. Results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) 
shows that when the crime rate is doubled, the time it takes to achieve a central posting decreases by 14%. 
We control for observable measures of ability and demographic characteristics. We also control for 
institutional level factors through the variable Number of Armed Police. Column (2) of Table 5 adds the 
control for average district turnover (District Average Time To Center), which has little effect on 
significance or coefficients. Among the other controls, the coefficient of the variable Language Migrant is 
significant and negative, suggesting that an individual who migrates from a state where a different language 
is spoken is likely to perform better in the short term and to take less time to achieve a central posting. 
Individuals with more degrees (Number of Degrees) also win promotions more quickly. We find that all 
other controls of observable measures of ability, such as initial rank in the IAS Entrance Examination (Rank 
in IAS Exam), and whether the individual ever received an award, are insignificant. Gender and Birth Year 
are also insignificant, in Columns (1) and (2). The number of police present (Number of Armed Police), 
which is a measure of institutional strength has no effect on the significance or magnitude of the 
coefficients. Column (3) adds the control variable Whether State RP is Ally of Center and shows that the 
coefficient is not statistically significant; the estimates do not change drastically. This result indicates that 
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a political alliance between the state and the central government does not influence the estimates; this 
finding alleviates some of our concern that political influence drives our results. Column (4) adds 
specialization of training courses as a control variable (Specialization) which is significantly associated 
with the promotion rates. 
[Table 5 goes here] 
  Columns 1 to 3 of Table 6 tests Hypothesis 2, i.e. the relation between being initially deployed to 
more challenging workplace contexts and faster career advancement in the long term, by showing evidence 
on the association between crime rate and officers’ average rate of promotion after reaching the center 
across all models. We find that doubling of the crime rate is associated with a ten-percent reduction in time 
until the next promotion. In Column (2) we add Whether State RP is Ally of Center and in Column (3) we 
add Specialization as control variables. In all columns we add the years take to reach the center (Years To 
Center) as a control variable in order to account for the possibility that the rate of early promotion acts as a 
positive signal on the manager’s CV, and influences subsequent career advancement prospects. We do not 
find any effect of adding the control; our results are strengthened by the addition of this variable. The 
coefficient on the control itself is significant and positive but very small in magnitude and therefore 
economically insignificant. 
[Table 6 goes here] 
To test Hypothesis 3, i.e. whether or not being initially deployed to a more challenging workplace 
context is correlated to advancing to higher levels on the organizational career ladder, we conduct logistic 
estimation to check whether the likelihood of attaining particular high-level job titles (listed in Appendix) 
after reaching the center varies with challenge. We find that the benefits of challenge persist up to the level 
of deputy secretary—individuals from more challenging contexts are more likely to be promoted to the rank 
of deputy rank—but not further. Column (4) in Table 6 shows that initial assignment to a challenging 
context makes no significant difference in the likelihood of attaining the status of Joint Secretary (Joint 
Secretary). The status of Joint Secretary is considered to be the stepping-stone into the upper echelons of 
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management within the organization. Thus we do not find any evidence that officers are more likely to be 
promoted to higher positions if they were initially assigned to more challenging contexts. 18 
 
Suggestive Evidence on Mechanisms 
In this section we present some suggestive evidence on the two mechanisms by which challenging contexts 
influence career advancement: a) opportunities to acquire skills through on-the-job learning and b) 
motivation to relocate leading to higher effort. For this analysis, we use a hybrid approach of seeking 
qualitative and quantitative evidence.  
To illustrate the first mechanism related to opportunities to acquire skills on the job, we conducted 
interviews with several IAS officers who had worked in high-crime-rate districts. We interviewed Sumita 
Dawra, a 1991 batch IAS officer who was collector of Karimnagar, a high-crime-rate district with a Maoist 
insurgency problem. Ms. Dawra described several examples of how the challenging context created 
opportunities for the development of problem solving skills19. One example relates to the creation of a 
bridge school for 147 orphaned or displaced girls who had no access to education, no real homes, and were 
being targeted by the Maoists to join their cause. Sumita did not officially have resources to rehabilitate 
and house these girls, but she recognized that it was imperative to educate and board the young girls. She 
was able to renovate an abandoned guesthouse of the Roads and Buildings department in a remote village 
to serve both as their school and their dorm. Four lady volunteers from adjoining villages served as teachers.  
No government official ever used this facility due to fear of the insurgents. While this project was being 
implemented, Sumita continued to travel to this remote village in a Government car but used fake number 
plates to avoid being spotted by the insurgents. Later, she would travel in the local village bus, after being 
told that the Maoists would not blow up the village bus and alienate the villagers. Sumita told the researchers 
                                                          
18 A concern with this estimation is that the number of individuals at the upper echelons is small and the test may be too weak to 
estimate the true effect of challenge on status. At the suggestion of our editor we checked for the power of the test and found it to 
be adequate.  
19 Ms. Dawra has more examples in her bestselling book “Poor but Spirited in Karimnagar. Field Notes of a Civil Servant”. 
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that her stint in Karimnagar taught her “how to get things done, in the face of uncertainty, threats, and little 
resources.”  
We also interviewed another IAS officer, who elucidated how a challenging context demands novel 
problem solving and thereby creates opportunities for acquiring skills. The interviewee (who wished to 
remain unnamed), then a junior collector in the Telengana region, recounted how IAS officers posted to the 
Maoist-influenced Adilabad district of Telengana applied problem-solving techniques to two governmental 
policy initiatives: the “Anganwadi” (Mother-and-Child-Care center) program and the “individual 
household latrines” (IHHL) program to install toilets in homes. As noted earlier, Maoist presence increases 
uncertainty in the implementation of such programs and poses threats to the officials who administer them. 
To work around these challenges in Adilabad, one IAS officer deployed to the region painted the 
Anganwadi center in bright colors and employed relatives of known Maoists at the center. Painting the 
center vividly, an apparently trivial exercise, drew the attention of local residents to the activities of the 
center; employing Maoists’ family members alleviated uncertainty about security and interference in the 
centers’ operations.  
The same IAS officer employed a unique approach to the IHHL program. The central government 
in India allocates approximately $200 to each household that installs a toilet: $100 when the pit is dug and 
a second installment of $100 when the project is completed. In Telengana, villagers are extremely wary ex 
ante digging a pit in anticipation of $100 that may never be disbursed, as Maoists, whose local operations 
have been characterized as an “independent governance machinery,” often disrupt the distribution of 
government subsidies. The IAS officer addressed their fears by diverting funds from another government 
program and prepaying villagers before the pit was dug. To ensure that the $100 payment was not siphoned, 
the IAS officer put extra layers of monitoring in place and negotiated a bulk deal with a contractor to reduce 
the costs of installing toilets.  
In summary, the high-crime-rate context presented Ms. Dawra and the junior IAS officer 
opportunities to develop skills related to problem solving and utilization of scarce resources. 
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 In Table 7 we provide evidence on the second mechanism, i.e. motivation to relocate, that would 
manifest in higher effort. In Column (1) of Table 7 we estimate the association of the number of courses 
(Number of Courses) taken with the degree of challenge (Crime) in the district. It shows that managers in 
more challenging contexts take a higher number of training courses prior to being posted to the center. Next 
we examine the kind of courses: whether they are targeted towards providing leadership skills or not 
(LeadershipTraining)20. Column (2) shows that managers in more challenging contexts are more likely to 
take more number of leadership courses. We interpret this evidence as signals of motivation of the 
individual. The higher number of courses and leadership-oriented courses signal preparation for higher 
organizational responsibilities and this is likely to influence speed of career advancement.  
 [Table 7 goes here] 
Robustness Checks 
High-crime areas have been found to be associated with higher underreporting of data (Soares 2004); they 
tend to have lower-quality institutions and reporting mechanisms. To address this question, we use two 
further proxies for challenge (Red District and Coal Present), which are measures of uncertainty and threats 
and are decoupled from institutional strength. We find that being deployed to a Red District is associated 
with a positive increase in the likelihood of reaching the center and, conditional on promotion, with a 
reduction in the time it takes (shown in Table (8) in Appendix) to reach the center. We repeat the above 
estimation with a dummy for coal districts (Coal Present) as the independent variable and find consistent 
results. This lends support to our findings even if underreporting of crime is systemic in certain districts.  
We also collect data on the number of police officers killed or injured in each district, and use this 
as an explanatory variable (rather than using a district’s reported crime rate as an independent variable)21. 
Our reasoning is that even if crime is systemically underreported, districts are unlikely to underreport police 
killings or injuries and this data is verifiable through the media. We do not find any difference in either the 
                                                          
20 We use keywords in the title. Courses which have “Leadership” or “Decision-making” or “Executive” in the title are 
considered to be targeting leadership skills.  
21 Results available with authors. 
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order of magnitude of coefficients or the levels of significance in these regressions. This finding further 
alleviates our concerns about underreporting of data. 
A significant concern about our study is that faster central postings might constitute rewards to 
young officers from the senior IAS bureaucracy for bearing the risks of deployment to high-crime district 
or a result of systematic corruption within the state. We conducted an additional test of this alternative 
hypothesis by categorizing individuals by the length of time taken to achieve a central posting.  The results 
of our multinomial logit estimation show that crime rate does not differentially affect any particular 
category. If we had found evidence that those who took longer were benefitting differentially from higher 
crime rates, that result would have suggested that individuals who had spent more time in high-crime-rate 
districts were being “rewarded” for time spent. Since we do not find such evidence, our concerns are 
somewhat mitigated. 
To follow up these robustness checks, we conducted interviews with two IAS officers to address 
this question: Mr. Dilip Ghosh and Mr. M.N. Roy. Mr. Ghosh joined the IAS in 1992 and retired in 2012; 
his last position was Secretary of the Health and Family Welfare Department of the State of West Bengal. 
He strongly rejected the notion of systematic interference by any party in decisions on central postings: “I 
do not believe that there is any deliberate government policy to pull officers out of high-crime-rate states. 
The government is keen on staffing central offices with high-caliber individuals, not just anybody.” He also 
explained the motives of IAS officers from high-crime states who seek central postings: “IAS officers posted 
in high-crime-rate states show a lot of tadvir, or motivation, to get themselves out of that situation. They 
are much more eager to get themselves to the center than officers posted in the better states like West 
Bengal or Gujarat.” 
Mr. Ghosh’s opinion was echoed by Mr. M.N. Ray, who joined the IAS in 1980 and retired as the 
Additional Chief Secretary and Director General of the Administration Training Institute of West Bengal. 
“The center has no incentive to appoint anybody but the best to central postings,” Mr. Ray asserted. “After 
all, the final decision is carried out by the Ministerial Department itself. Why should they appoint inferior 
officers?” He further explained the process of selection: “Once an officer seeks central posting, there is a 
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rigorous process that kicks in: the Personnel Ministry scrutinizes the CV, background, experience, and the 
inclination to join the center.” Officers in high-crime-rate states are motivated not merely by safety 
considerations but also by family concerns other than career ambition. “Often the spouse cannot find any 
work. Education for children becomes a concern,” he explained, adding: “A central posting brings you all-
India exposure, and you also have a shot at international assignments. There is just higher potential to rise 
at the national level.”  
  
Discussion 
This paper documents evidence that early-career assignment to a challenging workplace context is related 
to more rapid career advancement in both the short and the long term but is not associated with higher 
likelihood of promotion into the upper echelons. We also provide suggestive evidence on two mechanisms 
at play: opportunities for developing skills through on-the-job learning (‘crucible opportunities’) and 
motivation to exert greater effort and relocate out of the challenging context. It is also interesting that we 
are able to show lasting effects of initial conditions, long after the initial push created by the motivation to 
leave difficult postings has receded. 
 Our paper contributes to the literatures on careers, human capital, microfoundations of human-
capital development, and imprinting. First, our conclusions add to the growing literature linking early work 
experience and career outcomes, such as (Burton, Sorenson and Beckman 2002; Castilla 2005; Higgins 
2005; Huckman and Pisano 2006; Groysberg et al. 2008; McEvily et al. 2012; Campbell 2013; Tilcisk 
2014). They show that early challenges can shape the rate of career advancement, possibly through 
mechanisms like learning, socialization, formation of norms, etc. Our study exploits the quasi-random 
assignment of individuals to address the selection concerns to which scholars in this literature have alluded. 
We also advance this literature by linking heterogeneity of career outcomes within a cohort of employees 
to the differences in the contextual environment of the location to which they are deployed. The prior 
literature has implicitly assumed that a cohort of new employees who join an organization at the same time 
encounter relative homogeneity in economic and technological conditions, such as macro-economic 
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resource environments (Schoar and Zuo, 2011, Tilcsik, 2014); organizational conditions, such as 
organizational culture and task environment (Higgins 2005, Dokko et al., 2009); and firm size, firm age, 
and structure of opportunities (Sorensen 2007, Sorensen and Sharkey, 2014). We argue theoretically and 
provide empirical evidence that there could be differences in such employees’ context attributable to the 
locations they are deployed to, leading in turn to heterogeneity in individual career outcomes. Dokko et al. 
(2009) concede that “differences in context lead to differences in learning” while arguing that learning at 
other firms functions as an imperfect substitute for learning within the current firm. We extend this logic to 
argue for variation in career advancement due to differences in locational context, even for employees 
within the same firm and the same cohort. In the prior literature, this insight is related to the findings of 
Briscoe and Kellogg (2011), who find that initial assignment to powerful supervisors leads to heterogeneity 
in career outcomes. Our findings are also related to a call for further research in the imprinting literature, 
Marquis and Tilcsik’s observation that “we are still far from a detailed understanding of how past conditions 
shape the distribution of opportunities and rewards within organizations” (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013, p. 
232). 
Our findings have additional implications for the literature on imprinting (Briscoe and Kellogg 
2011, Marquis and Tilcsik 2013, Tilcsik 2014).  First, while this literature has mostly studied the effect of 
early conditions on individual performance, we contribute to this literature by linking conditions early in 
an individual’s career to subsequent career advancement. Second, though the empirical literature on 
imprinting is relatively focused on resource imprinting, our study shows that challenge in initial conditions 
can stem from other environmental factors related to social and political conditions. This finding is in 
keeping with the broader imprinting literature, and with the characterization of the environment as a varied 
n-dimensional space in which a set of economic, technological, and other conditions jointly constitute the 
imprint of the period (Marquis and Tilcsik 2013). Third, our secondary findings on acquisition of specific 
skills during deployment to a challenging context are related to the construct of “exaptation” in the 
imprinting literature (Higgins 2005, Marquis and Huang 2010), a process whereby a capability developed 
as an adaptive response to initial conditions later becomes useful for a different purpose. Finally, our finding 
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that challenge is not associated with upper echelon promotions suggests a novel limitation of the effect of 
early conditions on subsequent individual performance. The prior literature has outlined limitations of early 
conditions: Tilcsik (2014) introduced the concept of “imprint-environment fit” to explain why an imprinted 
experience’s direction of influence might be positive in one period and negative in another. 
 We also contribute to the stream of literature on human capital that deals with how organizations 
can persuade employees to invest in developing their own human capital (Wang et al. 2009, Wang and 
Barney 2006). An underlying assumption of this literature is that organizations must make formal 
investments to develop human capital of employees. We follow Campbell (2013) and Bidwell et al. (2014) 
in suggesting mechanisms of human-capital acquisition other than formal organizational investments to 
suggest that organizations may instead be well served by leveraging high-ability employees’ job 
assignments; deploying high-ability employees to challenging contexts early in their careers may substitute 
for, or complement, costly formal investments in developing human capital. Practitioners also face the 
challenge of aligning incentives optimally to extract the best performance from early-careers and our 
findings will be of interest to them as well. Moreover, our paper theorizes about and provides suggestive 
evidence that, for high-ability employees, a challenging context can mitigate the moral hazard of shirking 
and low motivation (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Coff 1997). 
Lastly, we add to the conversation on microfoundations, in which scholars have recently called for 
studying macro-to-micro causation. The authors (Barney and Felin 2013, p. 15) cite Winter’s (2011) recent 
call for scholars of strategy to focus on “contextual factors” and add, “(this call) raises micro questions: 
whose (objective) context are we talking about? Presumably, among different actors, there is large variance 
in what these contextual factors are. Or, is there indeed some macro-environmental context or situation that 
we can speak about?” We theorize and provide evidence that locational context—a macro-level variable—
affects individual career advancement and human-capital development. Our findings contribute to the 
macro-to-micro causation research that Barney and Felin (2013) encourage scholars to undertake.  
 
Limitations and Future Direction for Research 
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Our paper has limited external validity. We study a single organization in India—a diverse but singular 
country. A boundary condition of our paper is that we examine the career trajectories of a very skewed 
sample of the population: individuals with observably high ability who are likely to have a high degree of 
intrinsic motivation. Thus we are less likely to see such a divergence in career advancement outcomes. A 
more heterogeneous population might respond to challenge differently. It is conceivable that lower-ability 
individuals do in fact “sink” when deployed to challenging contexts. Though most of the literature has 
found challenge to be associated with higher leadership skill-acquisition, Courtright, Colbert and Choi 
(2014) have demonstrated that challenging contexts may influence individuals’ skill acquisition 
differentially as challenge is also associated with greater managerial emotional exhaustion and destructive 
leadership behavior. What is a crucible experience for some can be a breaking experience for others. 
Contextual challenge could act as a filtration mechanism, distinguishing the sheep from the goats. Future 
work focused on a heterogeneous sample of individuals could explore the interaction effects of the 
distribution of individual characteristics, such as observed ability, with the distribution of challenge across 
locations22. 
In the human-capital literature, evidence of human-capital development has been established using 
the presence of pecuniary rewards or other such explicit mechanisms, such as in Campbell (2013). Because 
we do not observe managers’ external mobility, we cannot determine the external wages they would 
command in the labor market. However, we do see faster promotions, which entail higher compensation 
for accumulated knowledge and skills, and is suggestive of human-capital development. This is evidence 
on value creation, as defined by Molloy and Barney (2015, p. 313). Our data does not allow us to observe 
value capture by the organization. A key area for future research would be to delineate how, at the macro 
level, organizations can appropriate value from human capital created at the micro level.  
 Our results showing positive effects of a challenging workplace context on rates of career 
advancement but not on final organizational position attained, suggests several possible interpretations and 
                                                          
22 Based on suggestions of our reviewers and editor we examined the interaction effects of ability measures but did not find any 
significant results. A more heterogeneous sample may yield interesting differences by ability. 
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opens avenues for future research. An explanation is that challenge can burn out individuals faster: once 
individuals attain a certain status within the organization, they are unwilling to continue to make the effort 
to keep climbing the ladder. An individual who was thrown into a challenging context early, and swam 
rather than sank, is likely to rest on his or her laurels sooner than those who had no such early experiences. 
Our findings corroborate and extend those by Courtright, Colbert and Choi (2014) who point out that some 
individuals are more emotionally exhausted than others by challenging tasks; our findings suggest that, for 
some managers, emotional exhaustion may be delayed but not completely absent. A second explanation is 
that managers stop climbing simply because they did not acquire the “right” kind of human capital: 
managers initially assigned to challenging contexts develop the specific skill necessary to be promoted 
rather than how to be effective leaders, a scenario that eventually leads to mid-career plateauing. These are 
interesting questions for future research.  
Future work could also evaluate our findings in other empirical settings. An example of a suitable 
alternative empirical setting is the military. For example, it would be interesting to study whether an early-
career stint in the army has an impact on managers' career advancement.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, our study provides managers insights into the variation in possible career advancement 
outcomes depending on exposure to different early workplace contexts. A recent worldwide survey of 
expatriate managers in 390 cities about the best and worst places to work used such indicators as “quality 
of life,” “family life,” “ease of settling in,” and the like to measure managers’ satisfaction.23 Our findings 
suggest that, even if challenging job assignments cause personal disadvantages, it may be worthwhile to 
sacrifice short-term satisfaction for long-term human-capital development and career advancement. Our 
findings also have managerial relevance for practitioners responsible for hiring: recruiters should seek to 
use the ‘individual-location’ pairing to differentiate individuals’ learning, performance and human capital. 
                                                          
23 http://www.internations.org/expat-insider/2014/the-best-and-worst-places-for-expats (accessed 31 March 2015). 
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As an example, a hiring manager should seek to understand differences in career advancement outcomes, 
and human capital development even among employees who worked at the same firm (e.g. Microsoft), 
across same years (e.g. 2010-2015) but were deployed across various locations such as Beijing, Herzelia, 
Israel, and Redmond, Washington. 
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Table 1 Correlation Matrix 
 
Years To 
Center 
Average Years 
Taken to be 
Promoted after 
Center Crime 
Language 
Migrant 
Number of 
Languages 
Number 
of 
Degrees 
Whether 
awarded 
prize 
IAS 
Rank 
Birth 
Year Male 
Years To Center 1          
Average Years Taken to 
be Promoted after Center 0.085 1         
Crime 0.116 -0.047 1        
Language Migrant -0.201 0.040 -0.218 1       
Number of Languages  -0.060 0.009 -0.121 0.217 1      
Number of Degrees 0.053 0.048 -0.052 -0.058 0.165 1     
Whether Awarded Prize 0.090 0.002 -0.109 0.079 -0.070 0.131 1    
IAS Rank -0.042 0.025 0.001 0.161 0.048 -0.034 0.131 1   
Birth Year -0.195 -0.107 -0.048 0.199 -0.067 -0.315 -0.043 -0.268 1  
Male -0.008 -0.005 0.034 0.003 -0.001 -0.006 0.023 0.0601 -0.206 1 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Definition mean sd min max 
Year joined IAS 1996 9.538 1975 2012 
Birth Year 1969 8.871 1955 1989 
Male 0.840 0.367 0 1 
 
Years To Center 16 6.9 3.9 39.1 
 
Raw Crime (Annual crime rate per 100,000 district inhabitants) 1.690 5.252 .0078 44.96 
 
Language Migrant  0.417 0.493 0 1 
 
Number of Languages 2.049 0.879 1 7 
 
Number of Degrees  1.713 1.139 0 9 
Whether Awarded Prize 0.019 0.137 0 1 
 
IAS Rank 48.89 31.56 1 147 
 
Average Years Taken to be Promoted after Center 1.630 0.778 1.066 7 
Whether State’s ruling party (RP) is an Ally of the Center  0.390 0.488 0 1 
District Average Time to Center 6.203 168.0 5.419 7.222 
 
Number of Armed Police (Annual number per 100,000 inhabitants) 9.339 0.869 5.922 10.462 
Number of Courses 6.338 1.706 5 17 
     
 
Table 4 Mean Number of Years until Promotion to the Center in High-Crime-Rate vs. Low-Crime-Rate 
Districts  
 
Years To Center 
 HighCrime LowCrime 
Means 15.013 17.067 
Standard deviation 5.99 7.81 
Skewness 1.10 2.31 
Kurtosis 4.36 13.78 
   
Notes. A district’s crime rate is designated as high when it is one standard deviation higher than the median of the 
sample, and as low when it is more than one standard deviation lower than the median of the sample. The difference 
in means is significant at the 1% level, with a t-stat of 5.14. Both measures have positive measures of skewness and 
kurtosis, indicating that they are asymmetrical with long tails. The high-crime-rate districts have lower kurtosis values, 
indicating that the distribution is narrow and sharp relative to that of low-crime-rate districts. This pattern seems to 
indicate that, conditional on winning a central posting, most individuals from high-crime-rate districts are likely to 
achieve it sooner than those from low-crime-rate districts. In low-crime-rate districts, a greater proportion of 
individuals take longer to achieve central postings. 
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Table 5 Effect of Workplace Context on Number of Years to Promotion to Center 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Years To 
Center 
Years To 
Center 
Years To 
Center 
Years To 
Center 
          
Crime -0.140** -0.130** -0.058** -0.063** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.029) (0.031) 
Male -0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.052) 
Number of Languages -0.007 -0.007 -0.021 -0.025 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Birth Year -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.038*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Whether Awarded Prize 0.027 0.026 0.159 0.160 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.097) (0.099) 
Language Migrant -0.157*** -0.166*** -0.209*** -0.202*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.042) (0.044) 
Number of Degrees -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.052*** -0.053*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
IAS Rank 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
District Average Time to Center  0.131 0.040 0.040 
  (0.138) (0.041) (0.043) 
Number of Armed Police -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Whether State RP is Ally of Center   0.057 0.063 
   (0.037) (0.039) 
Specialization    -0.121* 
    (0.069) 
Observations 996 996 996 888 
     
 
Notes. The table presents the parametric estimates of the survival analysis with number of years until posting to the 
center as the dependent variable. All columns include fixed effects for district and cohort. Columns 2 and 3 add new 
control variables but the baseline estimates remain unchanged. Column 4 adds specialized training courses as a 
variable: greater specialization is associated with faster promotion.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
  
33 
 
Table 6 Effect of Workplace Context on Average Number of Years it takes to be promoted after reaching 
Center (Delhi) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Average Years 
Taken to be 
Promoted after 
Center 
Average Years 
Taken to be 
Promoted after 
Center 
Average Years 
Taken to be 
Promoted after 
Center 
Joint 
Secretary 
         
Crime -0.089* -0.095** -0.102** -1.634 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (1.017) 
Specialization   0.092 -0.598 
   (0.118) (0.598) 
Male 0.021 0.025 0.024 -0.693* 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.414) 
Number of Languages -0.030 -0.031 -0.030 -0.180 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.130) 
Birth Year -0.017*** -0.015** -0.016** -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.088) 
Whether Awarded Prize 0.048 0.053 0.039 0.440 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.436) 
Whether Language Migrant -0.020 -0.022 -0.019 1.441 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (1.156) 
Number of Degrees -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 0.423 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.454) 
IAS Rank 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.151 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.139) 
District Average Time to Center -0.098 -0.096 -0.094 -0.007 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.005) 
Whether State RP is Ally of Center  0.045 0.055 -0.566 
  (0.055) (0.056) (1.575) 
Years To Center 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 1.180*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.357) 
Observations 501 501 490 478 
     
 
Notes. The table presents the parametric estimates of the survival analysis with the average wait to be promoted after 
reaching the Center (i.e. Delhi) as the dependent variable. All columns include fixed effects for the district and cohort. 
Columns 2 and 3 add new control variables but the baseline estimates remain unchanged. Column 4 estimates the 
logistic estimation of likelihood of being a Joint Secretary as a function of crime of the district of origin.  
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7:  Suggestive Evidence on mechanisms: Training courses 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Number of Courses Leadership Training 
      
Crime 0.376* 0.032* 
 (0.196) (0.016) 
Male 0.254*** 0.027 
 (0.089) (0.027) 
Number of Languages 0.031 0.013 
 (0.029) (0.009) 
Whether Awarded Prize -0.157 0.012 
 (0.207) (0.020) 
Language Migrant -0.331*** 0.010 
 (0.071) (0.021) 
Number of Degrees 0.095*** 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.055) 
IAS Rank 0.002** -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.091) 
Observations 501 501 
   
Notes. This table provides associations between number of courses and leadership training with crime for individuals 
posted to the center, prior to the posting. The sample in this table consists of individuals posted to the Center, but these 
results are robust to the entire sample of individuals: individuals from high crime districts take a higher number of 
courses and are more likely to take leadership training. Column 1 shows that individuals from higher crime rate 
districts take higher number of courses. Column 2 estimates the effect of average crime rate on propensity to seek 
leadership courses for the entire sample. The outcome variable is a dummy = 1 if the individual chose a course that 
teaches leadership skills. The estimation shows that individuals from high-crime districts are more likely to take 
leadership courses. All regressions include fixed effects for district and cohort. 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Figure 1. Kernel Density Distribution of Years To Center across High- and Low-Crime-Rate Districts 
 
 
Notes. A district is designated as high-crime when its crime rate is more than one standard deviation higher than the 
median of the sample and as low-crime rate when its crime rate is more than one standard deviation lower than the 
median of the sample. The mean number of years it takes to achieve a central posting from a high-crime-rate district 
is 15.013 years; from a low-crime-rate district it is 17.067 years, the difference being significant at the 1% level, with 
a t-stat of 4.64. Both measures have positive measures of skewness and kurtosis, indicating that they are asymmetrical 
with long tails. The high-crime-rate districts have higher kurtosis values, indicating that the distribution is narrow and 
sharp relative to that of low-crime-rate districts. This pattern seems to indicate that, conditional on promotion to the 
center, most individuals from high-crime-rate districts achieve promotion within a narrower time frame than their 
counterparts in low-crime-rate districts. In low-crime-rate districts, a greater proportion of individuals take longer to 
be promoted to the center.  
 
Figure 2 Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Years To Center 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates of Years to Center. On average individuals from high 
crime-rate districts take fewer number of years to reach the center. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 3 Short-Term Performance, High-Crime-Rate Districts (top panel, mean = 17 years) and Low-Crime-
Rate Districts (bottom panel, mean = 15 years) 
 
 
 
 
 
Promotion 
Hierarchy within  
the Center 
 
 
 
 
Designation Title 
1 Under Secretary in the Government of India 
2 Deputy Secretary in the Government of India 
3 Director in the Government of India 
4 Joint Secretary in the Government of India 
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5 Additional Secretary in the Government of India 
6 Secretary to the Government of India/Chief Secretary 
7 Cabinet Secretary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
Table 2 Validation of Quasi-Random Assignment: OLS Estimates Showing Association between Observables and Crime Rate of Assigned District  
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Crime Crime Crime Crime Crime Crime Crime 
                
Number of Languages -0.011       
 (0.0122)       
Language Migrant  0.040      
  (0.0255)      
Number of Degrees   -0.002     
   (0.0117)     
Whether Awarded Prize    -0.092    
    (0.0617)    
IAS Rank     -0.000   
     (0.000401)   
Birth Year      0.011***  
      (0.00304)  
Male       0.002 
       (0.0299) 
Observations 1,329 1,226 1,343 1,343 1,227 1,343 1,343 
        
 
Notes. OLS regression of the log of average crime rate on IAS rank on independent variables. This table shows that there is no statistically meaningful or significant 
association between the average crime rate of a district and all independent variables used (other than Birth Year) and all observable measures of ability. The 
finding of no association between crime rate and IAS rank (Column 6) lends support to the quasi-random assignment of individuals to locational contexts.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 Robustness Check: Survival Analysis estimates of years taken to be promoted to the Center by presence of 
Coal and whether the district is in the Red Corridor or not 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Years To Center Years To Center 
      
Red District -0.035**  
 (0.019)  
Male -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Number of Languages -0.016 -0.011 
 (0.018) (0.037) 
Birth Year -0.040*** -0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Whether Awarded Prize 0.175* 0.173* 
 (0.099) (0.098) 
Language Migrant -0.220*** -0.217*** 
 (0.044) (0.043) 
Number of Degrees -0.064*** -0.078*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) 
IAS Rank 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
District Average Time to Center 0.054 0.087 
 (0.043) (0.043) 
Number of Armed Police 0.021 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.038) 
Whether State RP is Ally of Center 0.045 0.036 
 (0.038) (0.039) 
Specialization -0.108 -0.106 
 (0.070) (0.070) 
Coal Present  -0.106* 
  (0.064) 
Observations 888 888 
   
 
Notes. Column 1 presents the survival analysis estimates of years taken promoted to the center if the district is in the 
red corridor of not is present in the district. Column 2 presents survival-analysis estimates presenting estimates of 
years taken to be promoted to the center if coal is present in the district or not. District and cohort fixed effects were 
used to control for time-invariant correlates. 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
